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A Shapley-érték a tartozásos játékokban 




Tartozásos probléma esetén a fizetésképtelen vállalat eszközeit el kell osztani a 
hitelezők és a vállalat között, miközben a vállalkozásnak bizonyos szabadsága van a 
hitelezőkkel folytatott tárgyalások során. A tárgyalásokat kooperatív játékokkal 
modellezzük, és elemezzük a Shapley-értéket az ilyen tartozásos problémák 
megoldása érdekében. Belátjuk a Shapley-érték három fő monotonitási tulajdonságát. 
Először is, a hitelezők mindig jobban járnak, ha nő a követelésük vagy az eszközérték. 
Másodszor, a vállalat egy tartozás növekedéséből csak profitálhat, de jobban vagy 
rosszabbul is járhat, ha az eszközérték növekszik, a kis és nagy tartozások 
összetételétől függően. Harmadszor, a nagyobb követelésekkel rendelkező hitelezők 
jobban részesülnek az eszközérték növekedéséből. Annak ellenére, hogy a tartozásos 
játékok konstans összegű játékok, és megmutatjuk, hogy a Shapley-érték közvetlenül 
kiszámolható egy tartozásos probléma adataiból, a kapcsolódó kooperatív játék 
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1 Introduction
An insolvent firm (country, state, individual, etc.) with some asset value has liabilities
towards a group of creditors. Compared to standard bankruptcy games as studied in the
game-theoretical literature (see O’Neill (1982) for a seminal contribution and Thomson
(2013), and Thomson (2015) for recent surveys) Csóka and Herings (2019) introduced
liability problems, by modeling the firm as an explicit player. A liability problem is
given by the asset value of the firm to be allocated and the claims of the creditors.
Instead of directly using the values given in a liability problem, Csóka and Herings
(2019) defined liability games to indirectly allocate the asset value using a solution
concept from cooperative game theory. The worth of a coalition in a liability game is
defined as follows. Given a coalition and its complement, the firm first makes payments
to the coalition it belongs to, up to the value of the liabilities in the firm’s coalition and
the asset value of the firm, and then (if possible) pays to the complementary coalition.
They remarked that liability games are superadditive: there is no loss of merging disjoint
coalitions. Moreover, they proved that the core of a liability game is empty and analyzed
one of the two most popular solution concepts, the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969).
In this paper, we investigate the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) of liability games.
The numerous applications of the Shapley value include aircraft landing fees (Littlechild
and Owen, 1973; Dubey, 1982), minimal cost spanning trees (Bergantinos and Lorenzo-
Freire, 2008), a combinatorial structure called augmenting system (Bilbao and Ordóñez,
2009), directed graph games (Khmelnitskaya, Selçuk, and Talman, 2016), risk capital
allocation (Balog, Bátyi, Csóka, and Pintér, 2017), and for environmental costs in supply
chains (Ciardiello, Genovese, and Simpson, 2018) among others.
We show that the Shapley value can also be used as an allocation rule, that is, it
allocates the asset value non-negatively among the creditors and the firm in such a way
that no creditor gets more than his liability. We establish lower and upper bounds for
the Shapley payments. Moreover, we show that (i) creditors can only benefit from the
increase in their claims or of the asset value; (ii) the firm can only benefit from the
increase of a claim but can end up with more or with less if the asset value increases,
depending on the configuration of small and large liabilities; (iii) creditors with larger
claims benefit more from the increase of the asset value. In most cases, we even establish
sharp upper bounds for the changes in the payments.
It is easy to check that in liability games, for one or two creditors (that is, for two
or three players), the Shapley value coincides with the nucleolus. However, for three or
more creditors, they give different payoffs in generic examples. Csóka and Herings (2019)
showed that at the nucleolus of a liability game, the firm gets a positive payment, which
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is at most half of the asset value. We show that at the Shapley value, there are cases
when the firm can keep almost the whole asset value. Csóka and Herings (2019) also
showed that at the nucleolus, creditors with higher liabilities receive higher payments,
but they also get higher debt forgiveness (defined as the difference between the liability
and the received payments), a result we also have for the Shapley value. They also
provided conditions under which the nucleolus coincides with a generalized proportional
rule, where the firm gets a positive amount, and the rest is allocated in proportional to
the liabilities.
Csóka and Herings (2019) noted that in a liability game, the worth of a coalition
plus the worth of the complementary coalition is always equal to the asset value, that
is, a liability game is a constant-sum game (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944).
Originally, Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) analyzed strategic non-cooperative
games, where a coalition and the complementary coalition play a constant-sum game.
They discussed constant-sum simple games with winning or losing coalitions, where the
worth of any coalition can be either zero or one. A prominent application is (weighted)
majority voting games, where the worth of the grand coalition is one, and if a coalition
is winning, then its complementary coalition is losing. Constant-sum games also play a
role in games modeling Bitcoin mining pools (Lewenberg, Bachrach, Sompolinsky, Zohar,
and Rosenschein, 2015). For a recent generalization to alpha-constant-sum games, see
Wang, van den Brink, Sun, Xu, and Zou (2019). A related new concept is called games of
threats (Kohlberg and Neyman, 2018), where the constant-sum is zero, but the value of
the empty coalition is not always zero. For more details on the value theory of strategic
games, see Cai, Candogan, Daskalakis, and Papadimitriou (2016).
Since constant-sum games are exciting on their own, we first study the Shapley
value for constant-sum games in general. We propose a basis for the linear vector space
of constant-sum games that provides a specialized formula for the Shapley payoff to
a player in a constant-sum game. It turns out that some of those general results are
very handy for liability games. We obtain a simple computational scheme by which the
Shapley value of a liability game is derived directly from the liability problem, that is,
from the asset value and the liabilities.
In general, computing the Shapley value based on its definition is practically im-
possible for large games. Computing the Shapley value in weighted majority games is
#P-complete (Deng and Papadimitriou, 1994) and one has to rely on its estimation. Es-
timation techniques were introduced by Castro, Gómez, and Tejada (2009) and Castro,
Gómez, Molina, and Tejada (2017). However, for special classes of games, the Shapley
value can be calculated in a polynomial manner (Megiddo, 1978; Granot, Kuipers, and
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Chopra, 2002; Castro, Gómez, and Tejada, 2008). We show that in liability games,
calculating the Shapley value of the insolvent firm is NP-hard. Thus even though the
Shapley value can be calculated directly from the liability problem, its application to
large liability problems could become computationally laborious.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we consider general constant-sum
games. In Section 3, we introduce liability games, show that the Shapley value can be
used as an allocation rule, and provide two examples. In Section 4, we prove various
properties of the Shapley allocation rule. Section 5, we show that calculating the Shapley
value of the firm is NP-hard.
2 The Shapley value of constant-sum games
A transferable utility cooperative game (N, v) is a pair where N is a non-empty, finite
set of players and v : 2N → R is a coalitional function satisfying v(∅) = 0. The number
v(S) is regarded as the worth of the coalition S ⊆ N . We identify the game with its
coalitional function since the player set N is fixed throughout the paper. The game
(N, v) is called 0-normalized if v({i}) = 0 for every i ∈ N ; superadditive if S ∩ T = ∅
implies v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) for every two coalitions S, T ⊆ N . The game (N, v) is
constant-sum if v(S) + v(N \ S) = v(N) for every coalition S ⊆ N .
Given a game (N, v), a payoff allocation x ∈ RN represents the payoffs to the players.
The total payoff to coalition S ⊆ N is denoted by x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi if S 6= ∅ and x(∅) = 0.
In a game v, we say the payoff allocation x is efficient, if x(N) = v(N); individually
rational, if xi = x({i}) ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N ; coalitionally rational, if x(S) ≥ v(S) for
all S ⊆ N . The set of preimputations, I∗(v), consists of the efficient payoff vectors, the
set of imputations, I(v), consists of the individually rational preimputations, and the
core, C(v), is the set of coalitionally rational (pre)imputations. We call a game balanced
if its core is non-empty.
We denote the set of all cooperative games on a fixed player set N by GN . It is
well-known that GN is a linear vector space of dimension 2n− 1 where n = |N |. A value
on GN is a map f : GN → RN , which assigns to every game v on N a vector f(v) with
components fi(v) for all i ∈ N . We say that value f satisfies
• linearity : if f(αv + βw) = αf(v) + βf(w) holds for all α, β ∈ R and v, w ∈ GN .
• efficiency : if
∑
j∈N fj(v) = v(N) holds for all v ∈ GN .
• equal treatment property : if j, k ∈ N are symmetric players in game v ∈ GN , that
is if v(S ∪ j) = v(S ∪ k) ∀S ⊆ N \ {j, k}, then fj(v) = fk(v).
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• dummy player property : if j ∈ N is a dummy player in game v ∈ GN , that is if
v(S ∪ j)− v(S) = v(j) ∀S ⊆ N \ j, then fj(v) = v(j).
The best known and most frequently used value was introduced and characterized
by a few appealing properties by Lloyd Shapley.














) and s = |S|, n = |N |, is the only value on GN
that satisfies linearity, efficiency, the equal treatment property, and the dummy player
property.
The Shapley value can also be axiomatized using a different set of axioms, see Young
(1985) for the axioms, Pintér (2015) for different classes of games and in particular
Khmelnitskaya (2003) for constant-sum games.
It is well-known that the weight coefficients {γN(S)}S⊆N\i form a probability distri-
bution, we call it the Shapley distribution, on the family 2N\i of coalitions that does not
contain player i. Therefore, φi(v) is the expected marginal contribution of player i in v
to coalitions not containing i, when the random formation of such coalitions is described
by the Shapley distribution. Since γN(S) depends only on the cardinalities n = |N | and
s = |S| of the two coalitions, we also write γn(s) when more convenient.
Next, we derive a specialized formula for the Shapley value of constant-sum games.
We denote the set of all constant-sum games on fixed player set N by GNCS.
Proposition 2. The Shapley value of constant-sum game v ∈ GNCS is
φi(v) = −v(N) + 2
∑
S⊆N\i
γN(S)v(S ∪ i) (i ∈ N). (2)
Proof. Let v be a constant-sum game and i ∈ N be fixed. For S ⊆ N \ i, we have
v(S) = v(N)− v(N \ S) = v(N)− v((N \ i \ S)∪ i). If we substitute this in the general
formula (1), we get φi(v) =
∑
S⊆N\i






= γn(n − 1 − s) and N \ i \ S ⊆ N \ i, each coalition value
of type v(T ∪ i) for T ⊆ N \ i appears twice and is weighted by the same coefficient
in the sum. Taking out the constant term −v(N) from the summation, we get formula
(2).
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Notice that in constant-sum games, the Shapley payoff to a player depends on the
values of coalitions the player belongs to, no need to compute his marginal contributions.
Next, we investigate how the Shapley value of constant-sum games can be computed
based on its linearity. It is easily seen that any linear combination of constant-sum
games is also a constant-sum game. Thus GNCS is a linear subspace of GN . It is well-
known that additive games are the only balanced constant-sum games, so the standard
approach of decomposing a game as a linear combination of unanimity games cannot
be followed for GNCS. Only the additive unanimity games, that is, the dictator games
u{i} (i ∈ N), could be part of a basis for GNCS, but they are sufficient to span only the
n-dimensional linear subspace of GNCS consisting of the additive constant-sum games.
Foreshadowing the application of these game-theoretic results to a special type of
constant-sum games induced by liability problems with an insolvent firm, we arbitrarily
choose a player (the insolvent firm) and denote him by 0 ∈ N . The set of the n−1 other
players is denoted by C = N \ {0}. Given this fixed “highlighted” player, the family
of all coalitions is decomposed in two parts of equal size: the 2n−1 “partner” coalitions
containing 0 and the 2n−1 “complement” coalitions. Let P0 = {S ⊆ N : 0 ∈ S} denote
the family of partner coalitions of 0, and C0 = {S ⊆ N : 0 /∈ S} denote the family
coalitions not containing 0. Obviously, S ∈ P0 if and only if N \ S ∈ C0, In particular,
N ∈ P0 and ∅ ∈ C0, also {0} ∈ P0 and C ∈ C0.
In a constant-sum game v ∈ GNCS, we have v(N \ S) = v(N) − v(S) for all S ∈ P0,
thus the values of the partner coalitions v(S) (S ∈ P0) suffice to fully determine v. It
follows that the dimension of GNCS is at most 2n−1 = |P0|. Next, we show that, in fact,
equality holds. We present 2n−1 linearly independent “elementary” constant-sum games,
which form a very “convenient” basis of GNCS, the scalar coefficients in the (unique) linear
decompositions are simply the coalitional values.
We define for 0 ∈ R ( N the constant-sum game dR ∈ GNCS for all S ⊆ N by
dR(S) =

1, if S = R,
−1, if S = N \R,
0, otherwise.
(3)
For R = N , the constant-sum game dN ∈ GNCS is defined for all S ⊆ N as
dN(S) =
1, if S = N or 0 /∈ S 6= ∅,0, otherwise. (4)
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It is easily checked that dR(∅) = 0 and dR is indeed constant-sum for all R ∈ P0.
Moreover, dN(N) = 1 but dR(N) = 0 for all N 6= R ∈ P0. Notice that for all R, S ∈ P0,
we have dR(S) = 1 if and only if R = S, but dR(S) = 0 otherwise. It follows that the
2n−1 = |P0| games dR (R ∈ P0) are linearly independent in GNCS.
We summarize the above discussion in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. The games dR ∈ GNCS (R ∈ P0) form a basis of GNCS, henceforth
dim(GNCS) = 2n−1. Moreover, v(S) =
∑
R∈P0
v(R) · dR(S) for all S ⊆ N and v ∈ GNCS.




The following example illustrates this proposition and foreshadows the subsequent
general discussion. For the sake of compactness, coalitions will be described without
braces and separating commas but overlined: for example, 0jk means coalition {0, j, k}.
Its value is shorthanded as v0jk = v(0jk).
Example 4 (n = 3, N = 0 ∪ 12).
P0 C0
S 0 01 02 N ∅ 1 2 12
v(S) v0 v01 v02 vN 0 vN − v02 vN − v01 vN − v0
d0(S) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1
d01(S) 0 1 0 0 0 0 −1 0
d02(S) 0 0 1 0 0 −1 0 0
dN(S) 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1
Trivially, v(S) = v0·d0(S)+v01·d01(S)+v02·d02(S)+vN ·dN(S) for all S ⊆ N and v ∈ GNCS.
We get that the Shapley value of any 3-player constant-sum game v (with distinguished
player 0) can be computed as the linear combination of the Shapley values of the above
four constant-sum basis games: φ(v) = v0 ·φ(d0) + v01 ·φ(d01) + v02 ·φ(d02) + vN ·φ(dN).
By formula (2), the Shapley payoffs to our special player 0 in the basis games:
φ0(d
0) = 2γ3(0) = 2/3, φ0(d
01) = 2γ3(1) = 2/6, φ0(d
02) = 2γ3(1) = 2/6, and φ0(d
N) =
−1 + 2γ3(2) = −1/3.
The payoffs to players 1 and 2 are then easily obtained from the efficiency and equal
treatment property of the Shapley value. In d0 players 1 and 2 are symmetric, in d01
players 0 and 1 are symmetric, in d02 players 0 and 2 are symmetric, finally in dN again
the complement players 1 and 2 are symmetric. By simple arithmetic, we get the sharing
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system (5).
φ0 φ1 φ2 v ∈ G012CS
d0 2/3 −1/3 −1/3 ·v0
d01 1/3 1/3 −2/3 ·v01
d02 1/3 −2/3 1/3 ·v02
dN −1/3 2/3 2/3 ·vN
(5)
The Shapley payoffs are easily computed from sharing system (5) for any 3-player
constant-sum game v with distinguished player 0. We simply take the linear combination
of the “partner” coalition values weighted with the “shares” of the given player. In
formula,
φ0(v) =
2v0 + v01 + v02 − vN
3
, φi(v) =
−v0 + v0i − 2v0j + 2vN
3
(i 6= j). (6)
The arguments of the above example can be generalized to obtain a similar sharing
system in general. Since the basis game values dR(S) (R, S ∈ P0) form a unit matrix,




 2γn(r − 1), if R 6= N,−1 + 2γn(n− 1, ) if R = N. (7)
The payoffs to the players in C = N \{0} can then be easily obtained from the efficiency
and equal treatment property of the Shapley value.
For R ∈ P0 \ {N}, in basis game dR the players in R are all symmetric, so φ0(dR) =
φi(d
R) for all i ∈ R. Similarly, the players in N \R are all symmetric, so φj(dR) = φk(dR)
for all j, k ∈ N \ R. Since dR(N) = 0, efficiency gives rφ0(dR) + (n − r)φk(dR) = 0,
where k ∈ N \R. From (7) we easily derive the Shapley payoffs in basis game dR when
R 6= N .
φi(d
R) =
2γn(r − 1), if i ∈ R,−2γn(r), if i ∈ N \R. (8)
For R = N , in basis game dN all non-distinguished players in C are symmetric, so
φj(d
N) = φk(d
N) for all j, k ∈ N \ {0}. Since dN(N) = 1, efficiency gives φ0(dN) + (n−
8
1)φk(d
N) = 1, where k 6= 0. From (7), we easily get the Shapley payoffs in dN as
φi(d
N) =
−1 + 2γn(n− 1), if i = 0,2γn(n− 1), if i 6= 0. (9)
Sharing system (10) schematically summarizes the above formulas. The columns corre-
spond to the partner coalitions of the form R = {0} ∪ S. The rows give the Shapley
values of players in the basis constant-sum games, first for our distinguished player 0,
second for a generic other player i ∈ C.
s = 0 · · · s = |S| · · · s = n− 1






























φ0 2γn(0) · · · 2γn(s) 2γn(s) · · · −1 + 2γn(n− 1) = 1
φi −2γn(1) · · · 2γn(s) −2γn(s+ 1) · · · 2γn(n− 1) = 0
= 0 · · · = 0 · · · = 1
(10)
Any given player i ∈ C can either be a partner of player 0 or not. Thus, except when














coalitions do not contain i. The
following features of the Shapley sharing system are easily checked.
Proposition 5. In the Shapley sharing system (10)
1. the φ0 row sum = 1, every other φi (i ∈ C) row sum = 0;
2. the s = n− 1 column sum = 1, every other 0 ≤ s ≤ n− 2 column sum = 0.
Although in a general constant-sum game distinguishing one arbitrarily picked player
served only technical purposes, next, we discuss a special type of constant-sum games
where one player is indeed “different” from the other players.
3 Liability games and the Shapley value
We consider a special class of constant-sum games, liability games, introduced by Csóka
and Herings (2019).
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Let N = {0, 1, . . . , c} denote the set of agents, where agent 0 is a firm having a set of
creditors C = {1, . . . , c} with cardinality |C| = c ≥ 1. The firm has asset value A ∈ R+
and liabilities ` ∈ RC+, with `i ∈ R+ the liability to creditor i ∈ C. The question is how
to allocate the asset value among the creditors and the firm. If the firm is solvent, that
is,
∑
i∈C `i ≤ A, then the obvious solution is that every creditor receives its full claim
and the firm keeps the rest. Henceforth we only consider the insolvent case, but for ease
of presentation, we also allow borderline solvency, that is,
∑
i∈C `i = A.
Definition 6. A liability problem is a pair (A, `) ∈ R+ × RC+ such that
∑
i∈C `i ≥ A.
Let LN denote the class of liability problems1 on set of agents N = {0} ∪ C. We
seek a liability rule that assigns a unique allocation to each liability problem.
Definition 7 (Csóka and Herings (2019)). A liability rule is a function f : LN → RN+
such that, for every (A, `) ∈ LN , the payment vector f = f(A, `) ∈ RN is an allocation,
that is a non-negative vector f ∈ R+ × RC+ satisfying liabilities boundedness, that is,
fi ≤ `i for all i ∈ C, and efficiency, that is,
∑
i∈N fi = A.
Note that by non-negativity and efficiency, the payments in allocation f ∈ RN fall
between the following bounds:
0 ≤ f0 ≤ A and 0 ≤ fi ≤ `Ai for all i ∈ C,
where `Ai = min{A, `i} is the truncated liability of creditor i ∈ C. Let `A ∈ RC+ denote
the vector of liabilities truncated by the asset value.
Given a subset of creditors S ⊆ C, we will use the notation `S = `(S) =
∑
i∈S `i for




i for the total truncated liabilities of S. On
the other hand, we will also use the shorthand `AS = min{A, `(S)} = min{A, `A(S)} for
the truncated total (truncated) liabilities of creditor group S ⊆ C. Clearly, `AS ≤ `A(S),
and equality holds if and only if `(S) ≤ A.
A liability problem gives rise to a transferable utility cooperative game called liability
game (Csóka and Herings, 2019).
Definition 8. Let (A, `) ∈ LN be a liability problem. On player set N , the induced
liability game v : 2N → R is defined by setting, for S ∈ 2N ,
v(S) =
{
min{A, `(S \ {0})} = `AS\{0}, if 0 ∈ S,
max{0, A− `(C \ S)}, if 0 6∈ S.
1Csóka and Herings (2019) considers a slightly restricted class, when all liabilities are at most as
large as the asset value, the asset value is strictly positive, there are at least two creditors and the firm
is insolvent.
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Note that v(∅) = 0, 0 ≤ v(S) ≤ A for all S ∈ 2N , and v(N) = A. Csóka and
Herings (2019) notes that liability games are superadditive, that is, for all S, T ∈ 2N ,
S ∩ T implies v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ); and constant-sum, that is, for all S ∈ 2N ,
v(S)+v(N \S) = v(N). Due to their superadditivity and nonnegativity, liability games
are monotonic, that is, for all S, T ∈ 2N , S ⊂ T implies v(S) ≤ v(T ).
We aim to define a liability allocation rule by applying the Shapley value to the
induced liability game. This works in practice only if we can compute the Shapley-vector
of the liability game directly from the data of the underlying liability problem, that is,
from the asset value and the liabilities. The following straightforward observation implies
that our indirect approach could only provide a liability rule that ignores excessive parts
of the claims. Notice that cutting off the parts of liabilities over the asset value does
not make the firm solvent, that is, `(C) ≥ A implies `A(C) ≥ A.
Remark 9. Liability problems (A, `) and (A, `A) induce the same liability game, where
`A denotes the vector of liabilities truncated by the asset value.
It follows that the Shapley rule (or any other allocation rule defined via a single-valued
solution of the induced game) is different from rules that allocate (some portion of) the
asset value among the creditors proportional to their claims. We will see in Example
11 that the Shapley rule is also different from rules that allocate (some portion of) the
asset value among the creditors proportional to their truncated liabilities.
Next, we show that the Shapley value indeed defines a liability rule, that is, the
Shapley-vector of the liability game associated with a liability problem is an allocation.
Proposition 10. Let (A, `) ∈ LN be a liability problem and let v be the induced liability
game on N . Then the Shapley-vector φ(v) of v satisfies efficiency, non-negativity, and
(truncated) liabilities boundedness.
Proof. The Shapley value assigns an efficient vector to any TU game, so for any liability
game (N, v) we have
∑
i∈N φi(v) = v(N) = A. The other two properties follow from
formula (1), once we show 0 ≤ v(S ∪ 0) − v(S) for all S ⊆ C = N \ 0 and 0 ≤
v(S ∪ i)− v(S) ≤ `i for all i ∈ C, S ⊆ N \ i.
All marginal contributions of the firm are non-negative. Indeed, v(S ∪ 0) − v(S) =
min{`(S), A}−max{A−`(C \S), 0} is obviously non-negative if the second term is zero.
If it is positive, that is, A > `(C\S), then insolvency of the firm gives `(S) ≥ A−`(C\S),
and that, coupled with the obvious A ≥ A − `(C \ S), implies non-negativity of the
marginal contribution.
Now let i ∈ C be a creditor and S ⊆ N \ i. We have two cases. If 0 ∈ S, so v(S∪ i)−
v(S) = min{`(S \ 0) + `i, A}−min{`(S \ 0), A}, then the difference is clearly between 0
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and `i. If 0 /∈ S, so v(S ∪ i)− v(S) = max{A− `(C \S) + `i, 0}−max{A− `(C \S), 0},
then again the difference is clearly between 0 and `i. Thus, we get non-negativity of all
marginal contributions for all creditors, as well as liabilities boundedness.
Since non-negativity and efficiency imply φi ≤ A for all i ∈ N , including the firm,
for creditor i ∈ C we can sharpen the upper bound to φi ≤ `Ai .
Next, we define (truncated) debt forgiveness of a creditor as the difference between
the (truncated) liability towards him and the payment he receives. Formally, let (A, `) ∈
LN be a liability problem and x ∈ RN+ be an allocation. The debt forgiveness of creditor
i ∈ C is given by `i − xi. The truncated debt forgiveness by creditor i ∈ C is given by
`Ai − xi = min{A, `i} − xi.
Example 11. Consider a generic liability problem with two creditors, so N = {0, 1, 2}
and A ≤ `1 + `2. The induced liability game v is the following:
S {0} {1} {2} {0, 1} {0, 2} {1, 2} {0, 1, 2}
v(S) 0 A− `A2 A− `A1 `A1 `A2 A A
The Shapley-payments can be obtained from formulas (6) derived for 3-player constant-
sum games. The bounds follow from A ≤ `1 + `2 implying A ≤ `A1 + `A2 ≤ 2A.
For the firm,








Clearly both bounds are sharp. Notice that at the Shapley allocation, an insolvent firm
ends up with a strictly positive payoff.




`Ai − 2`Aj + 2A
3
= `Ai − 2φ0 ≤ `Ai .
It is easily seen that both bounds are sharp. For the debt forgiveness and for the
truncated debt forgiveness of creditor i ∈ C, we immediately get the following sharp
bounds:
`i − `Ai ≤ `i − φi ≤ `i −
`Ai
3




Observe that both creditors give the same truncated debt forgiveness (2φ0) to the firm.
It also follows from the above formulas that if `i ≤ `j, hence also `Ai ≤ `Aj , then
φi ≤ φj and `i − φi ≤ `j − φj. That is, at the Shapley allocation, the creditor with
higher claim gets higher payment, but it also gives an at least as high debt forgiveness.
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Example 12. Consider a generic liability problem with three creditors, so C = {1, 2, 3},
N = {0} ∪ C, and A ≤ `1 + `2 + `3. We compute the Shapley allocation from sharing
system (10) derived for constant-sum games using only values of coalitions, which contain
the distinguished player 0, now the firm. For n = 4 we get
S 3 0 {0} {0, 1} {0, 2} {0, 3} {0, 1, 2} {0, 1, 3} {0, 2, 3} N











φ0 1/2 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 −1/2
φ1 −1/6 1/6 −1/6 −1/6 1/6 1/6 −1/2 1/2
φ2 −1/6 −1/6 1/6 −1/6 1/6 −1/2 1/6 1/2
φ3 −1/6 −1/6 −1/6 1/6 −1/2 1/6 1/6 1/2
(11)
where `AS = min{A, `(S)} = min{A, `A(S)}. The Shapley payments are obtained by
multiplying row [v(S)] of the coalition values by row [φk] of the shares for player k ∈ N .








jk − A) with i 6= j 6= k ∈ C.
Since `Ai + `
A
jk −A = min{A, `i}+ min{A, `j + `k}−A = min{A, `i, `j + `k, L−A} with
L = `(C) ≥ A, we get 0 ≤ `Ai + `Ajk − A ≤ A. It follows that




It can be easily checked that both bounds are sharp. Notice that at the Shapley alloca-
tion, an insolvent firm ends up with a strictly positive payoff.








ij− `Aj )+ 16`
A
i with i 6= j 6= k ∈ C. Since 0 ≤ A− `Ajk = A−min{A, `j + `k} =
max{0, A−`j−`k} ≤ `Ai and 0 ≤ `Aij−`Aj = min{A, `i+`j}−`Aj = min{A, `Ai +`Aj }−`Aj =
min{A− `Aj , `Ai } ≤ `Ai , we get
`Ai
6
≤ φi ≤ `Ai .
Again, all these bounds are sharp. For the debt forgiveness and for the truncated debt
forgiveness of creditor i ∈ C we immediately get the following sharp bounds:
`i − `Ai ≤ `i − φi ≤ `i −
`Ai
6




Notice that if for creditors i 6= j we have `i ≤ `j, then 0 ≤ `Aj − `Ai ≤ `j − `i and




(`Aj − `Ai ) + 23(`
A
jk − `Aik), we get 0 ≤ φj − φi ≤ `Aj − `Ai ≤ `j − `i. It follows that at the
Shapley allocation, the creditor with higher claim gets higher payment (unless A ≤ `i, `j
when both get the same payment), but also gives an at least as high (truncated) debt
forgiveness.
4 Properties of the Shapley allocation rule
In this section, we generalize the observations we made on the Shapley allocations for
2- and 3-creditor liability problems in Examples 11 and 12, and investigate further
properties of the Shapley liability rule.
In Proposition 10, we showed that the Shapley rule satisfies efficiency, non-negativity
and (truncated) liabilities boundedness, hence it is a liability rule. It immediately follows
from these properties that the Shapley rule (as any liability rule) respects minimal rights
of creditors, that is, it satisfies φi ≥ max{0, A − `(C \ i)} for any i ∈ C. Notice that
the minimal right of creditor i is precisely his value v(i) in the liability game, which is
superadditive, and the Shapley value is well-known to prescribe individually acceptable
payoffs in superadditive games. Recall that in Remark 9 we noticed that the Shapley
rule (as any rule induced by a solution of an associated TU game) ignores excessive
parts of claims, that is, φ(A, `) = φ(A, `A).
Since liability games are constant-sum, from sharing table (10), taken into account
that v(0 ∪ S) = `AS for coalitions of the form 0 ∪ S with S ⊆ C, we get that for liability
problem (A, `) the Shapley rule prescribes the following payments.











S∪i − `AS ), (i ∈ C) (13)
where s = |S| and `AS = min{A,
∑
i∈S `i}.
First, we establish lower and upper bounds for the Shapley payment of the firm.
Proposition 13. Let (A, `) ∈ LN be a liability problem and let v be the induced liability
game on N . Then for the Shapley payment of the firm φ0 we have that









Proof. Since v(0) = `A∅ = 0, v(N) = `
A












If n = 2 then the summation in (15) is over the empty set, thus φ0(A, `) = 0. It
means that the Shapley rule allocates the full asset value to the single creditor. In
contrast, if c ≥ 2, then the firm has some implicit bargaining leverage by threatening
to form a coalition with the other creditors and compensate them first up to their
full liabilities or the asset value. From `AS + `
A
C\S = min{2A,A + `S, A + `C\S, `C} =
A + min{A, `S, `C\S, `C − A} and
∑
∅6=S 6=C γn(s) =
n−2
n
, where s = |S|, we get φ0 =∑
∅6=S 6=C
γn(s) min{A, `S, `C\S, `C − A}. Equation (14) now follows.
In the insolvent (non-degenerate) case, that is, if `C > A (and A > 0), mini∈C `i > 0),
the lower bound is positive, that is, the firm ends up with positive payoff. The lower
bound in (14) is sharp if and only if `C − A ≤ A and `C − A ≤ mini∈C `i, that is, the
deficiency of the firm does not exceed any of the individual liabilities and the asset value.
The upper bound in (14) is sharp if and only if A ≤ mini∈C `i (that implies `C −A ≥ A
for c ≥ 2), that is, all creditors claim the full asset value so each one is willing to forgive
some of its debt to stay a partner of the firm and receive some positive payment. Note
that in this case as the number of creditors increases, the firm can keep almost all the
asset value.
Second, we establish lower and upper bounds for the Shapley payments of the cred-
itors.
Proposition 14. Let (A, `) ∈ LN be a liability problem and let v be the induced liability
game on N . Then for any i ∈ C for the Shapley payment of the creditor φi have that
2
n(n− 1)











Proof. Since v(0) = `A∅ = 0 and γn(1) =
1









S∪i − `AS ). (17)
If n = 2, that is, C = {1}, then the summation in (17) is over the empty set, thus
φ1(A, `) = `
A
i . It means that the Shapley rule allocates the full asset value to the single
creditor. In contrast, if c ≥ 2 then the summation in (17) is clearly non-negative, and
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it is zero if and only if A ≤ `Ai for all i ∈ C. On the other side, `AS∪i − `AS = min{A −
`AS , `
A
i } ≤ `Ai in case of A > `AS . It follows from
∑
∅6=S⊆C\i


























summation in (17) is at most
(n− 2)(n+ 1)
n(n− 1)
`Ai , and equality holds if and only if A ≥ `C
(that implies A ≥ `S∪i for all S ⊆ C \ i).
Both bounds are sharp in (16). The lower bound is attained when all creditors claim
the full asset value, hence considerably weaken each other’s bargaining position. On the
other side, the creditors can be fully compensated if and only if the firm is solvent.
Next, we show that creditors with higher claims get higher Shapley payments, but
they also give higher (truncated) debt forgiveness.
Proposition 15. Let (A, `) ∈ LN be a liability problem and v the induced liability
game. Let i, j ∈ C be such that `i ≤ `j. At the Shapley value it holds that φi ≤ φj,
`i − φi ≤ `j − φj and `Ai − φi ≤ `Aj − φj.
Proof. Let i, j ∈ C be two creditors with `i ≤ `j, hence also `Ai ≤ `Aj . Since liability
games are constant-sum games, we use formula (2) to show 0 ≤ φj−φi ≤ `Aj −`Ai ≤ `j−`i.
When taking the difference φj − φi the terms v(S ∪ i∪ j), S ⊆ N \ {i, j}, containing











(v(S ∪ j)− v(S ∪ i)). (18)
It is easily checked from the definition of v that 0 ≤ v(S∪j)−v(S∪i) ≤ `Aj −`Ai ≤ `j−`i
for all S ⊆ N \ {i, j}. Substituting each term in (18) with these non-negative constant
bounds gives












































) = 1, and the obvious `Aj −`Ai ≤ `j−`i,
the claim follows.
The property formulated in Proposition 15 is called order preservation in the review
article on bankruptcy rules by Thomson (2015). It obviously implies equal treatment of
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equal creditors, that is, if two creditors have the same claims, then they should get the
same compensations. From Proposition 15 we readily get that the Shapley rule treats
creditors with equal (truncated) liabilities in the same way.
Corollary 16. Let (A, `) ∈ LN be a liability problem and v the induced liability game.
Let i, j ∈ C be such that `i = `j. At the Shapley value it holds that φi = φj, `i − φi =
`j − φj and `Ai − φi = `Aj − φj.
Next, we discuss monotonicity properties of liability rules. The question is how
changes in the parameters of a liability problem influence the payments of the agents.
First, we investigate what happens to the payment of one creditor if his liability
increases, but every other parameter of the problem stays put. We say that liability rule
f : LN → RN+ is liability monotonic if for any creditor i ∈ C and liability problems (A, `),
(A, `′) such that `′i > `i and `
′
k = `k for all k ∈ C \ i, it holds that fi(A, `′) ≥ fi(A, `).
We show that the Shapley rule is liability monotonic. Moreover, also the firm can only
benefit from the increase of a liability.
Proposition 17. Let liability problems (A, `) and (A, `′) be such that `′i > `i for i ∈ C,
and `′k = `k for all k ∈ C \ i. Then
φi(A, `
′) ≥ φi(A, `) +
2
n(n− 1)
min{`′i − `i, A− `Ai }.
Moreover, φ0(A, `
′) ≥ φ0(A, `).
Proof. Let liability problems (A, `) and (A, `′) be such that `′i > `i for i ∈ C, and `′k = `k
for all k ∈ C \ i. Clearly, `′AS∪i ≥ `AS∪i and `′AS = `AS whenever S ⊆ C \ i. From formula
(17) we get
φi(A, `
′)− φi(A, `) =
2
n(n− 1)





S∪i − `AS∪i). (20)
Since the summation term in (20) is non-negative, and `′Ai − `Ai = min{`′i − `i, A− `Ai },
the inequality for φi(A, `) follows.
From formula (12) we get
φ0(A, `










S − `AS ). (21)
Since each term in the first summation is non-negative, and zero in the second one, we
conclude that the payment to the firm can only increase if a liability increases.
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Second, we investigate the changes in the payments to the creditors and the firm if
the asset value increases, but all liabilities remain the same. We say that liability rule
f : LN → RN+ is asset monotonic for creditors if for any creditor i ∈ C and liability
problems (A, `), (A′, `) such that `(C) ≥ A′ > A, it holds that fi(A′, `) ≥ fi(A, `). We
show that the Shapley rule is asset monotonic for creditors, but the firm can end up
with smaller or with higher payoff.
Proposition 18. Let liability problems (A, `) and (A′, `) be such that `(C) ≥ A′ > A.
Then for any creditor i ∈ C,
0 ≤ φi(A′, `)− φi(A, `) ≤ min{A′ − A, `i},
and for the firm,
2− n
n




Moreover, for c = |C| ≥ 2, all bounds are sharp.
In case of a single creditor C = {1}, φ1(A′, `) − φ1(A, `) = A′ − A and φ0(A′, `) =
φ0(A, `).
Proof. Let liability problems (A, `) and (A′, `) be such that `(C) ≥ A′ > A. From
formula (13) we get for any i ∈ C,
φi(A







S∪i − `AS∪i)− (`A
′
S − `AS )
]
. (22)




S∪i − `AS∪i)− (`A
′








S )− (`AS∪i − `AS )
]
and the dif-
ference `AS∪i − `AS = min{`i, A − `AS} where A − `AS = max{A − `S, 0} is clearly non-
decreasing in A, we get that the difference in the bracket in each term is non-negative,
implying asset monotonicity for creditor i ∈ C.
Let us assume c ≥ 2. Then there are at least two different terms in (22). One is the





i − `Ai )− (0− 0)
]
. The difference in the bracket
can range from 0 (attained, if `i ≤ A < A′) to min{A′ − A, `i} (attained, if A < A′ ≤












(A′ − A)− (`A′C\i − `AC\i)
]
. Again, the difference in the bracket can range from 0
(attained, if A < A′ ≤ `C\i) to (A′ − A) (attained, if `C\i ≤ A < A′)). Likewise, if
`i ≤ A < A′ but A < A′ ≤ `j for any other creditor j 6= i, then all terms in (22) are
zero, implying that the zero lower bound is indeed sharp. In contrast, if A < A′ ≤ `i but
`C\i ≤ A < A′ (implying `j ≤ A < A′ for any other creditor j 6= i), then the differences
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in all brackets in (22) are equal to min{A′ − A, `i}. In light of 2
∑
S⊆C\i γn(s + 1) = 1,
the claimed upper bound is also sharp.
For the change in the Shapley payment to the firm, taken into account that `A∅ = 0
and `AC = A, from formula (12) we get
φ0(A





S − `AS ) +
2
n
(A′ − A). (23)
Since the difference `A
′
S − `AS is clearly non-negative but cannot exceed A′ − A, from∑
∅6=S(C γn(s) = 1 −
2
n
, the claimed inequalities for the difference φ0(A
′, `) − φ0(A, `)
follow. The negative lower bound is attained if `S ≤ A for every non-empty set of
creditors S 6= C implying `A′S − `AS = 0. The positive upper bound is attained if `i ≥ A′
for all creditors i ∈ C implying `S ≥ A′ and `A
′
S − `AS = A′ − A for every non-empty set
of creditors S 6= C.







i − `Ai )− (0− 0)
]
= A′ − A, reconfirming that the Shapley rule
gives everything to the single creditor. By efficiency, the firm ends up with nothing,
thus, φ0(A
′, `)− φ0(A, `) = 0− 0 = 0. Notice that for n = 2, the summation in (23) is
over the empty set, and the claimed lower and upper bounds coincide at zero.
The following property, called super-modularity by Thomson (2015), is a kind of
combination of order preservation (when the payments to two creditors in the same
problem are compared) and asset monotonicity (when the payments to the same creditor
in two related problems are compared). We say that liability rule f : LN → RN+ is
super-modular for creditors if for any two creditors i, j ∈ C with `i ≥ `j and liability
problems (A, `), (A′, `) such that `(C) ≥ A′ > A, it holds that fi(A′, `) − fi(A, `) ≥
fj(A
′, `)−fj(A, `). We show that the Shapley rule is super-modular for creditors, thus it
allocates from the increment in the asset value more to creditors with higher liabilities.
Proposition 19. Let liability problems (A, `) and (A′, `) be such that `(C) ≥ A′ > A.
If `i ≥ `j for creditors i, j ∈ C then
0 ≤ (φi(A′, `)− φi(A, `))− (φj(A′, `)− φj(A, `)) ≤ min{`i − `j;A′ − A}. (24)
Proof. Given two creditors i, j ∈ C, a set of creditors S ⊆ C can be one of four types:
S contains both i and j; contains i but not j; contains j but not i; contains neither i
nor j. For brevity, we represent S ⊆ C respectively as Rij, Ri, Rj, R with a generic
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Exchanging i and j gives φj(A


























Subtracting (26) from (25) gives (φi(A













Suppose `i ≥ `j, implying `Ri ≥ `Rj. It is easily checked that
(`A
′
Ri − `ARi)− (`A
′
Rj − `ARj) =

0, if `Rj ≤ `Ri ≤ A ≤ A′,
`Ri − A, if `Rj ≤ A ≤ `Ri ≤ A′,
A′ − A, if `Rj ≤ A ≤ A′ ≤ `Ri,
`Ri − `Rj, if A ≤ `Rj ≤ `Ri ≤ A′,
A′ − `Rj, if A ≤ `Rj ≤ A′ ≤ `Ri,
0, if A ≤ A′ ≤ `Rj ≤ `Ri.
It follows that
0 ≤ (`A′Ri − `ARi)− (`A
′
Rj − `ARj) ≤ min{`Ri − `Rj = `i − `j;A′ − A}.
Taken into account that∑
R⊆C\ij
[γn(r + 1) + γn(r + 2)] =
∑
R⊆C\ij







γn(s+ 1) = 1/2,
where q = |Q| and s = |S|, from (27) we get the claimed inequalities in (24).
A straightforward corollary of Proposition 19 is that if `i = `j for creditors i, j ∈ C
then
φi(A
′, `)− φi(A, `) = φj(A′, `)− φj(A, `).
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5 Complexity of computing the Shapley value
Even though liability games are constant-sum and we showed in (12) and (13) that the
Shapley value can be calculated directly from a liability problem, now we prove that
calculating the Shapley payoff to the firm is NP-hard.
Theorem 20. Given two liability problems and the induced liability games, it is NP-hard
to verify whether the firm has the same Shapley value in both games.
Proof. Recall the NP-complete subset sum problem SUBSUM (See for instance Garey
and Johnson (1979)): given a1, a2, . . . , an ∈ Z and K ∈ Z we ask whether there exists
a subset ai1 , ai2 , . . . , aik such that
∑
aij = K. Here we consider a special case of this
problem: HALFSUM: given positive integers a1, a2, . . . , an we ask whether there exists






. It is very easy to show by the following
steps that HALFSUM is still NP-complete.
• It is trivial to show that SUBSUM is NP-complete if we restrict it to even numbers,
so we can assume that
∑
ai is even.
• We get an equivalent instance of SUBSUM if we replace K by
∑
ai −K. Using










−K to the set.
We reduce HALFSUM to the Shapley value calculation. Let HS = (a1, a2, . . . , an)
be an instance of the HALFSUM problem. Consider the liability problems (A, `) and




. Let v and v2 be
the liability games corresponding to (A, `) and (A − 1, `), respectively. We show that
the defaulting firm has a different Shapley value in v and v2 if and only if the instance
of the HALFSUM problem has a solution.
Given a subset of creditors S ⊆ C, let mc(S) = v(S∪{0})−v(S) be the marginal con-
tribution of player 0 in the liability game v, corresponding to the first liability problem.
We claim that
mc(S) =
`(S), if `(S) ≤ A,`(C \ S), if `(S) ≥ A. (28)
To prove (28), recall that the value of the assets A is exactly half of the sum of
liabilities. Notice that creditors in S can be paid if and only if creditors in C \S cannot
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be paid. If `(S) ≤ A, then v(S) = 0, however, in this case v(S ∪ {0}) = `(S). If
`(S) ≥ A, then v(S) = A− `(C \ S) and v(S ∪ {0}) = A.




|S|!(n− |S| − 1)!mc(S) =
∑
`(S)<A




|S|!(n− |S| − 1)!A +
∑
`(S)>A
|S|!(n− |S| − 1)!`(C \ S). (29)
Now consider the game v2, that is, decrease the asset value A by 1. Let mc2(S) =
v2(S ∪ {0})− v2(S).
If S is a coalition such that `(S) < A, then `(S) ≤ A− 1, so the liabilities in S can
still be paid in v2 and `(C \ S) > A > A − 1, liabilities in C \ S obviously cannot be
paid with less asset value. It follows that v2(S) = 0 and v2(S ∪ {0}) = `(S). (Recall
that ` is the same in both problems.) Now let’s consider a coalition of creditors S ⊂ C
such that `(S) > A. In this case `(C \ S) < A, that is, `(C \ S) ≤ A − 1. Liabilities
in S cannot be paid and liabilities in C \ S can be paid not only in game v but also
in game v2. This means that v2(S) = A − 1 − `(C \ S) and v2(S ∪ {0}) = A − 1, so
mc(S) = (A− 1)− (A− 1− `(C \ S) = `(C \ S).
It follows that in (29), the first and the last term do not change in v2, implying that
if HS is a FALSE instance of problem HALFSUM, then the sum of these terms does
not change when we decrease the value of assets by 1. In this case, the second term is
empty.
On the other hand, let’s consider a coalition where `(S) = A exactly. In this case,
v(S) = 0 and v(S ∪ {0}) = mc(S) = A in the first game. However, in the second game,
v2(S) = v(S) = 0 but v2(S ∪ {0}) = mc2(S) = A− 1. If HS is a TRUE instance of the
HALFSUM problem, then the Shapley value of player 0 decreased in game v2 compared
to game v.
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Csóka, P., and P. J.-J. Herings (2019): “Liability games,” Games and Economic
Behavior, 116, 260–268.
Deng, X., and C. H. Papadimitriou (1994): “On the complexity of cooperative
solution concepts,” Mathematics of Operations Research, 19(2), 257–266.
Dubey, P. (1982): “The shapley value as aircraft landing fees–revisited,” Management
Science, 28(8), 869–874.
Garey, M. R., and D. S. Johnson (1979): Computers and intractability. WH Free-
man and Company, San Francisco.
Granot, D., J. Kuipers, and S. Chopra (2002): “Cost allocation for a tree network
with heterogeneous customers,” Mathematics of Operations Research, 27(4), 647–661.
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